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The Unconstitutionality of Religious Vilification 
Laws in Australia: Why Religious Vilification Laws 
Are Contrary to the Implied Freedom of Political 
Communication Affirmed in the Australian 
Constitution 
Dr. Augusto Zimmermann* 
ABSTRACT 
This article explains the weakness of the argument that religious 
vilification laws promote harmony and tolerance among religious groups. 
Rather, they are based on a form of postmodern theory that denies the existence 
of truth and could be used as a weapon by certain individuals to silence any 
criticism of their beliefs. These laws have become an invitation to people with 
extreme views to avoid debate by claiming that they, rather than their beliefs, 
have been attacked. The author then explains the philosophical underpinnings 
of religious vilification laws and argues that there is no a priori reason why 
religious speech could not at the same time be characterized as political 
communication for the purposes of the implied freedom in the Australian 
Constitution. Rather, the text and structure of the Constitution gives full rise to 
the proposition that there is an implied freedom to discuss religious matters, 
particularly when these matters involve serious public interest. This freedom is 
a right of the citizen that works as a form of constitutional immunity from 
public and/or political restrictions that are not adapted to the ultimate goal of 
preserving freedom of speech, which is an essential element of every (democratic) 
system of representative government. 
 
 * Associate Dean (Research) and Senior Lecturer in Constitutional Law and Legal 
Theory, Murdoch University School of Law, Western Australia; President, Western Australian 
Legal Theory Association (WALTA); Commissioner, Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australia. This article is based on a paper presented at the Annual International Law and 
Religion Symposium: ‘Religion, Democracy and Civil Society,’ Provo, Utah, October 7–10, 2012. 
The author would like to thank Professor Nicholas Aroney, Mr. Frank Gashumba and Mr. Vlada 
Lemaic for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Religious vilifications laws are supposedly designed to promote 
greater tolerance and harmony among religious groups. Yet these 
laws are conceptually unsound and produce results that are often 
antithetical to the tolerance the laws’ advocates claim or hope for. 
Aiming at promoting “cultural diversity,” these laws have become a 
permanent vehicle for religious extremists to silence the debate by 
allowing them to claim that they, rather than their beliefs, have been 
attacked. After critically analyzing the religious vilification law 
enacted in the Australian state of Victoria, this article explains why 
it is reasonable to suggest that there might exist under the 
Australian Constitution an implied right of freedom of speech 
concerning religious matters, which is in turn derived from the 
implied freedom of communication founded upon the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative government. 
II. THE VICTORIAN RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE ACT (2001) 
Of greatest concern in Australia has been the enactment of anti-
incitement laws on the grounds of religious vilification. Although the 
country has no federal legislation aiming at prohibiting “religious 
vilification,” three Australian states have passed such laws, namely 
Queensland,1 Tasmania,2 and Victoria. Since these laws are 
sufficiently similar that the considerations about them are 
substantially the same, the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance 
Act 2001 (hereinafter “RRTA”) will be taken as a representative. The 
 
 1. Queensland passed legislation introducing religion vilification laws in 2001. This Act 
is called the Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act 2001 (Qld) (Austl.). In a very similar provision to 
Victoria’s law, Queensland outlines that a person must not publically act in a way that would 
“incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons 
on the ground of [their] religion.” Id. at s 124A(1). The provision also provides the 
circumstances in which such an act could be legal: the act must be public, done reasonably and 
in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes; a publication of material that 
would be subject to the defense of absolute privilege in defamation case; or the publication of a 
fair report of a public act. Queensland also criminalizes serious religious vilification. The section 
dealing with serious religious vilification is comparable to the Victorian section. 
 2. Like Queensland and Victoria, Tasmania also has legislation containing provisions 
against religious vilification. Section 19 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas.) (Austl.) 
outlines that one must not publically act in a way which would incite “hatred towards, serious 
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or a group of persons on the ground of [their] 
religious belief[s] or affiliation[s].” 
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Victorian Act was passed on June 27, 2000, and became law on 
January 1, 2001.3 Section 8(1) of the RRTA provides: 
A person must not, on the ground of the religious belief or activity 
of another person or class of persons, engage in conduct that incites 
hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule 
of, that other person or class of persons.4 
The RRTA states that motives are irrelevant,5 and that religious 
belief need only be the substantial ground for the conduct.6 The 
RRTA further states that it is irrelevant whether the statement is 
true or false.7 Section 11 states that there is no contravention of 
sections 7 or 8 if the person is able to establish that the act was, in 
the circumstances, reasonable and in good faith for the purpose of 
genuine academic, artistic, religious, or scientific interest.8 Further, 
if the accused can establish that they reasonably believed that the 
conduct would be seen or heard only by themselves, then they will 
not be held to have contravened section 8.9 
A. Race vs. Religious Issues 
The RRTA is a law aimed at preventing instances of either 
religious or racial vilification, thus applying to religion the same 
formulations which are applied to race. However, if people cannot 
choose the color of their skin, religion is, to some degree at least, a 
matter of personal choice and not an immutable characteristic. In 
contrast to racial issues, where one finds no questions of “true” or 
“false,” religious beliefs involve ultimate claims to truth and error. 
As Ivan Hare points out, “religions inevitably make competing and 
often incompatible claims about the nature of the true god, the 
origins of the universe, the path to enlightenment and how to live a 
good life and so on. These sorts of claims are not mirrored in racial 
 
 3. Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) n. 1 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/rarta2001265/s31.htm. 
 4. Id. s 7(1). 
 5. Id. s 9(1). 
 6. Id. s 9(2). 
 7. Id. s 10. 
 8. Id. s 11. 
 9. Id. s 12. 
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discourse.”10 Therefore, one must assume that the laws of a 
democratic society “should be less ready to protect people from 
vilification based on the voluntary life choices of its citizens 
compared to an unchangeable attribute of their birth.”11 
B. Inversion of the Onus of the Proof 
The RRTA allows anyone to file a complaint of religious 
vilification.12 The burden of proof rests with the person who has 
been charged, instead of staying with the person who claims to be 
offended.13 This is a major breach of the rule-of-law principle that 
one is innocent until proven guilty. Those who are charged under the 
Victorian Act are required to prove why they have not committed 
vilification or why they would qualify for any exemptions. In so 
doing, they must bear all the legal expenses. In the meantime, those 
who bring the charges get the full backing of the state, often with all 
costs borne by the taxpayer.14 Of course, the risk of being dragged 
into court will deter many people from arguing the merits of 
someone’s religious beliefs and convictions. This self-imposed 
censorship of ideas will inevitably cause the “chilling effect” of 
limiting freedom of speech, because of “the fear of litigation and its 
risk of financial ruin, jail, collegial ostracism, or embarrassment.”15 
C. Motive and Truth Are Irrelevant 
The RRTA declares that the truth of a statement cannot be relied 
upon as a defense against the charge of vilification.16 In addition, 
section 10 states that in determining whether a person has 
 
 10. Ivan Hare, Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred, 
PUBLIC LAW 521, 531 (2006). 
 11. Rex Tauati Ahdar, Religious Vilification: Confused Policy, Unsound Principle and 
Unfortunate Law, 26 U. QUEENSL. L. J. 293, 301 (2007). 
 12. Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) s 19 (Austl.). 
 13. Id. s 9(1). 
 14. Bill Muehlenberg, The Problems with Vilification Legislation, ON LINE OPINION (Sept. 7, 
2005), http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3792. 
 15. Joel Harrison, Truth, Civility, and Religious Battlegrounds: The Context Between Religious 
Vilification Laws and Freedom of Expression, 12 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 71, 79 (2006). 
 16. Section 9 (1) of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) (Austl.) states: “In 
determining whether a person has contravened section 7 or 8, the person’s motive in engaging 
in any conduct is irrelevant.” 
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committed religious vilification, “it is irrelevant whether or not the 
person has made an assumption about the race or religious belief or 
activity of another person or class of persons that was incorrect at 
the time that the contravention is alleged to have taken place.”17 In 
other words, a person’s motive for engaging in such conduct is not 
deemed relevant for the purposes of the legislation, unless it falls 
within the exceptions of “good faith” art, academic, religion, science, 
or public interest.18 According to Joel Harrison, such legal 
exemptions reveal “a desire to impose the civility (fictional or 
otherwise) of academia onto the public sphere.”19 However, if 
stating the truth is irrelevant for the purposes of religious 
vilification, then section 8 “might be contravened by conduct which 
has the effect of inciting religious hatred even where the inciter had 
no intention to do so.”20 
III. THE CASE OF THE TWO PASTORS 
Although religious vilification laws are designed to penalize 
individuals who offend others on the basis of their beliefs, in practice 
they might lead to more inter-religious strife and social conflict.21 
Perhaps the most compelling argument against such laws is the Catch 
the Fire Ministries22 case in Victoria. This decision, the first major 
litigation on the subject in Australia, bears out all the concerns that 
religious vilification laws can be used as a weapon by radical groups 
to silence any form of criticism toward their religious beliefs. 
In 2002, three Muslims were encouraged to attend a seminar 
held by evangelical Christians on the subject of Islam by a Muslim 
employee who works for the Victorian government at the Equal 
Opportunity Commission.23 Importantly, this was a seminar only for 
Christians, and the three Muslims had not disclosed their identity.24 
 
 17. Id. s 10. 
 18. Id. s 11. 
 19. Harrison, supra note 15, at 86. 
 20. Ahdar, supra note 11, at 301. 
 21. Harrison, supra note 15, at 72. 
 22. Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT 2510 (Austl.), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2004/2510.html. 
 23. Id. at ¶¶ 63, 67. 
 24. So, even material designed for one particular religious group may need to be censored 
for fear of attracting unwelcome complaint. 
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But as Harrison points out, “in what is truly disquieting, the 
attendees were encouraged to attend at the behest of May Halou who 
was both a member of the Executive of the ICV (Islamic Council of 
Victoria) and employed by the Equal Opportunity Commission, the 
Act’s primary administrative body.”25 None of those Muslims 
attended the entire seminar, “but pursuant to a deliberate plan each 
had sat in at different times to ensure that the complete event was 
covered.”26 Each stated that they were “very upset” at what they 
heard.27  
On December 17, 2004, Judge Michael Higgins, presiding at the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), found both the 
speakers and organizers of that seminar, Pastors Daniel Scot and 
Danny Nalliah, guilty of inciting religious hatred against Victorian 
Muslims.28 In reality, the evidence of vilification against them was 
not based on whether the attendees felt hatred or contempt toward 
Muslims, but whether the three Muslim attendees (who did not 
reveal their faith and were technically not invited) felt offended by 
the comments about the Koran during the course of the seminar, 
even though they confessed under cross-examination that their 
knowledge of the Book was “slight.”29 
One significant aspect of the decision is that Judge Higgins found 
that “all [the] seven witnesses for the complainants could be relied 
upon, [and yet,] in one way or another, he rejected all the five 
witnesses for the respondents and refused [their] requests to call 
two . . . expert witnesses.”30 He then relied solely on the expert 
 
 25. Harrison, supra note 15, at ¶ 77. 
 26. Ahdar, supra note 11, at 293. See also Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 76. 
 27. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 77. 
 28. Barney Zwartz, Historic Win in Religious Hatred Case, THE AGE (December 18, 2004), 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Historic-win-in-religious-hatred-
case/2004/12/17/1102787271940.html. 
 29. For example, one of the complainants, Jan Patricia Jackson,  
said that she had been a Muslim for some four years, but that she is not a scholar of 
the Qur’an. She conceded that if Pastor Scot said that he had read the Qur’an as many 
times as he had and that was accurate, then he would have a better understanding 
than she would as to what was in the Qu’ran. 
Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 63. 
 30. Id. at ¶ 374 (e). See also Mark Durie, Catch the Fire and Daniel Scot’s (In)Credible 
Testimony, ON LINE OPINION (Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/ 
view.asp?article=3050; Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 375 (m). 
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witnesses for the complainants to reveal his view on what he 
believes to be the best or “more reasonable” interpretation of the 
Koran.31 However, as Robert Spencer reminds, 
There are some hints that the outcome of the case was virtually 
predetermined. When during the trial Scot began to read verses 
from the Koran that discriminate against women, a lawyer for the 
Islamic Council of Victoria, the organization that brought the suit, 
stopped him: reading the verses aloud, she said, would itself be 
religious vilification.32 
In the course of court proceedings, and in response to Pastor 
Scot’s assertion that “the prophet said all you who believe fight 
those disbelievers who are in your neighbourhood,”33 Judge Higgins 
relied on the expertise of Dr. Abdul Kazi for the ICV to assert that 
although the reference was correct, “the word ‘fighting/combating’ 
has been taken literally, rather than figuratively.”34 When asked 
whether Muslims would be bound to treat the life of Mohammed as 
an example of the morality which they would then apply in their own 
personal lives, Dr. Kazi replied: “That is so in a general sense, but 
you do not follow it in every way.”35 Judge Higgins happily accepted 
all these “liberal” interpretations, also relying on Dr. Kazi’s opinion 
that the term “jihad” cannot be applied literally, and that any such 
interpretation of the Koran “is totally false.”36 And yet, as law 
professors Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney point out, “traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence has [actually] tended to be literalistic in its 
interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna.”37 Although jihad includes 
the individual Muslim’s spiritual struggle, in traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence, according to general doctrine and in historical 
 
 31. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 375 (m). 
 32. Robert Spencer, Religious Vilification, HUMAN EVENTS (Jan. 24, 2005), 
http://www.humanevents.com/2004/12/22/pastors-found-guilty-of-religious-vilification-of-
muslims/. 
 33. KORAN 9:23. 
 34. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 157 (xi). 
 35. Id. at ¶ 180. 
 36. Id. at ¶ 157 (xvi). 
 37. Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney, The Topography of Shari’a in the Western Political 
Landscape, in SHARI’A IN THE WEST 19 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
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tradition, “the term jihad consists of military action with the primary 
objective of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence.”38  
In reply to the assertion by Pastor Scot that Mohammed was a 
pedophile for marrying Aishah when he was at the age of fifty-four 
and she was only six and consummating the marriage when she was 
nine, the following was stated by Dr. Kazi and paraphrased by Judge 
Higgins: “One cannot use a set of cultural values and people living 
them at one time [and] make a value and moral judgment on a 
totally different people in a different cultural context.”39 Enabled to 
rely on such moral relativism, Higgins went on to reveal a great 
interest to enter the complex theological debate of what the Koran 
does and does not require of its followers.40 This is not to say that 
the views of Pastor Scot are necessarily better than those of Dr. Kazi, 
endorsed by Judge Higgins; rather, the question is whether a secular 
judge (or tribunal) with no apparent theological expertise should be 
engaging in and deciding on such complex theological issues. 
In reality, the “liberal” interpretation of Islam given by Judge 
Higgins is highly debatable. It is an interpretation that has been 
fiercely contested in many theological circles, although it allowed 
him to regard the defendants as some sort of religious extremists for 
not agreeing with that view. These two pastors seemingly presented 
an “extremist view” of Islam that bears no relationship to 
“mainstream” Australian Muslim beliefs.41 The pastors thus joined a 
class of religious extremists who have misused Islamic doctrine and 
misrepresented the supposed peaceful nature of Islam. Hence, when 
questioned whether Pastor Nalliah believed the God of Islam to be 
the same as the God of Christianity, his reply that he strongly rejects 
 
 38. John Azumah, Spreading Islam: Personal and Community Motivations for Jihad and 
Terrorism, in ISLAM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 125 (David Claydon ed., 2009). Dr. John 
Azumah is a professor of Islam at the London School of Theology. He completed his MA and 
PhD in Islam at the University of Birmingham. According to him, “The doctrine of jihad 
originates from a form of dualism in Islam, which teaches a perpetual struggle between Allah 
and Satan, good and evil, belief and unbelief, Islam and non-Islam, Muslim and non-Muslim. 
Muslims are believed to be on the side of Allah and non-Muslims on the side of Satan and 
therefore enemies of Allah.” Id. at 128. The Koran declares in 4:76: “Those who are believers 
fight in the way of Allah, and the unbelievers fight in the idols’ way. So fight the friends of 
Satan; surely the guile of Satan is ever feeble.” 
 39. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 180. 
 40. Harrison, supra note 15, at 76. 
 41. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 387. 
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such proposition was interpreted by Judge Higgins as a further 
evidence of his “extreme views.”42 
To make it worse, the extraordinary statement for the ICV by 
Professor Gary Bouma that “Charismatic Christianity is as offensive 
to [Australians] as is Wahhabist Islam” was quoted approvingly by 
Judge Higgins.43 In the opinion of Professor Bouma, to raise fears 
about the possible Islamization of Australia’s society “would be like 
a group raising fears about the rise of Pentecostals in Australia, 
because large numbers of Pentecostals hold certain views in the 
United States.”44  
Ironically, in condemning the supposed “objectionable” elements 
of Scot’s speech, Professor Bouma and Judge Higgins have 
incidentally partaken in “disparaging an entire religious worldview to 
which many adhere, sending a message of authoritative public 
condemnation.”45 Judge Higgins even regarded as evidence of 
religious vilification to denounce the harsh persecution endured by 
millions of Christian minorities in Muslim-majority countries as a 
result of Islamic teachings.46 Such an approach, writes Dr. Mark 
Durie, “constitutes a dangerous limitation on freedom of speech and 
the capacity of Christians to take up the cause of the persecuted 
church.”47 
Not content in effectively vilifying an entire segment of the 
Australian Christian community by calling them the extremist 
equivalent of Islamic Wahabbism, Judge Higgins declared that “Islam 
agrees substantially with Christian beliefs save for particular 
events.”48 Yet, according to the Rev. Dr. David Palmer, who is the 
Convener of the Victorian Presbyterian Church’s Church and Nation 
Committee, the theological assumption that the Koran substantially 
agrees with core Christian beliefs would be “news to most Muslims 
and Christians, if not downright offensive to both.”49 
 
 42. Id. at ¶¶ 310, 375. 
 43. Id. at ¶ 136. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Harrison, supra note 15, at 92. 
 46. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶¶ 44, 391. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at ¶ 376. 
 49. See Barney Zwartz, Law Curbs Free Speech, Says Church, THE AGE (Mar. 30, 2005), 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Law-curbs-free-speech-says-
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Of course, such assumption that Christianity and Islam are 
similar religions may be expected from a secular judge without any 
apparent theological training. What is not so acceptable, however, is 
having a secular judge deciding rather complex, sometimes quite 
controversial, theological issues. For example, since Judge Higgins 
relied on his own secular worldview and completely ignored “the 
theological values attached to the concept of mercy in Islam,”50 he 
assumed to be “illogical and unsustainable” Pastor Scot’s opinion 
that mercy towards a thief under Islamic jurisprudence is to be 
shown only after the thief’s hand has been cut off.51 And yet, the 
Hadiths are clear that mercy is indeed to be applied only after the 
thief’s hand is amputated.52 
 
church/2005/03/29/1111862390121.html?from=moreStories. Indeed, as Dr. Mark Durie points 
out:  
There are profound and far-reaching differences in the attributes of [Yahweh] of the 
Bible and Allah of the Quran. The same is found to apply when one compares Jesus 
and the Holy Spirit of the Bible with Isa and the Ruh Al-Qudus of the Quran. These 
differences are deep and significant enough to make it reasonable to reject the claim 
that Christians and Muslims worship the same God or honour the same Christ. 
MARK DURIE, REVELATION: DO WE WORSHIP THE SAME GOD? JESUS, HOLY SPIRIT, GOD IN 
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 137 (2006). Rex M. Rogers, President of Cornerstone University and 
Grand Rapids Baptist Seminary, explains the basic differences between Islam and Christianity:  
Muslims presuppose that ‘there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet.’ 
They are monotheists, but their god has no partners (thus no Trinity), he does not 
beget (thus Jesus is not his Son), and he is responsible for good and evil. In the 
Islamic belief system, Allah is god of fate and fear. He is arbitrary and even capricious 
in his dealings with human beings. Muslims, therefore, cannot fully explain concepts 
like love, forgiveness, or peace, because the meaning of these concepts depends on 
the existence of a God who is both righteous and loving and who defines forgiveness 
in the work of his Son, Jesus. 
REX M. ROGERS, CHRISTIAN LIBERTY: LIVING FOR GOD IN A CHANGING CULTURE 47 (2003). 
 50. Mark Durie, Catch the Fire and Daniel Scot’s (In)Credible Testimony, ON LINE OPINION 
(Feb. 18, 2005), http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3050. 
 51. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶ 276. 
 52. 69 Hadith, in SAHIH MUSLIM, THE BOOK PERTAINING TO PUNISHMENTS PRESCRIBED BY 
ISLAM (KITAB AL-HUDUD), available at http://www.searchtruth.com/book_display.php?book 
=17&translator=2&start=10&number=4184. Sura 5:38 in the Koran states: “Cut off the hands 
of thieves, whether they are male or female, as punishment for what they have done – a 
deterrent from God: God is almighty and wise. But if anyone repents after his wrongdoing and 
makes amends, God will accept his repentance: God is most forgiving and merciful.” Thus the 
Hadith says that the repentance of a thief is accepted only after the thief’s hand is cut off: “The 
Prophet cut off the hand of a lady, and that lady used to come to me, and I used to convey her 
message to the Prophet and she repented, and her repentance was sincere.” Bukhari 81:72. 
Haddith by one Bukhari, 8:793, says the same: “Abu Abdullah said: ‘If a thief repents after his 
hand has been cut off, then his witness will be accepted. Similarly, if any person upon whom any 
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Following the decision, a “remedy” or “penalty” was announced 
on June 22, 2005.53 Judge Higgins ruled that the defendants had 
vilified Muslims and that, among other things, they would have to 
place a public statement expressing their apologies on their website 
as well as in two leading newspapers at the total cost of $70,000.54 
These advertisements would reach 2.5 million people, rather than 
the less than 250 who attended the seminar.55 As one might expect, 
the respondents appealed the decision. On August 14, 2006, the 
Court of Appeal found the decision to have contained numerous and 
quite substantial errors of fact.56 Judge Higgins, for example, had 
accused Pastor Scot of stating that “Muslims are demons,”57 when in 
fact he had merely pointed out that the Koran states that Allah had 
sent a group of demons (“jinn”), who, when they heard the Koran, 
became Muslims.58 There were many other errors and some quite 
serious misrepresentations in his judgment.59 As a result, the Court 
of Appeal found no other alternative but to remit the matter to the 
Tribunal to be heard before a different judge, as well as have the 
orders requiring a public apology set aside.60 
After the decision by the Court of Appeal, the case ended up 
being resolved through mediation between the parties and without 
the need for re-hearing, thus ending a litigation process that lasted 
five years.61 Regardless of its outcome, it is worth considering that 
the defendants spent a very substantial amount of money in 
litigation, the costs exceeding one million dollars.62 The excessive 
cost of litigation can of course easily result in the denial of justice. 
 
legal punishment has been inflicted, repents, his witness will be accepted.’” ASK THE KORAN, 
http://www.ask-the-quran.com/english/search/thief%20repents.html?start=0 (last visited Sept. 
7, 2013). 
 53. Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2005] VCAT 1159 (Austl.). 
 54. Id. at ¶ 16. 
 55. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶¶33, 383. 
 56. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. v Islamic Council of Victoria [2006] VSCA 284 (Austl.). 
 57. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. [2004] VCAT at ¶80. 
 58. Ian C.F. Spry, Legal Notes: The Totalitarian Effects of Anti-Free Speech Legislation, 2008 
NAT’L OBSERVER 64, 65. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Ahdar, supra note 11, at 305. 
 61. Id. at 305. 
 62. Paul Sheehan, Spreading the Word of Intolerance, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (October 4, 
2004), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/10/03/1096741896292.html#. 
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Since it may lie far beyond the financial capacity of most individuals 
and small organizations, defendants accused of religious vilification 
may be compelled to settle their cases with unfair concessions in the 
hope of avoiding costly litigation. This is in itself a form of 
punishment and a further denial of freedom of speech, meaning that 
the most vulnerable in this battleground are those who lack the 
resources and organizational clout to fund litigation. 
IV. CRIMINALIZATION OF TRUTH-TELLING 
Whereas Western societies in the past defined religious freedom 
as dependent on our freedom to search for truth, now “we put the 
emphasis upon creating a social, harmonious, and multicultural 
community.”63 In the Catch the Fire case, the Tribunal reminded us in 
its ruling that the truth is not a defense under the RRTA, thus 
opening the way for “vilification” to occur under the law, even 
though statements may be true. Of course, if a statement is true, it 
should be open to be stated freely in a democratic society. As with 
defamation cases, truth should be a complete defense against any 
charges of religious vilification. But if it is illegal to speak the truth, 
it can also be said that vilification laws may punish truthful speech 
and reward academic rhetoric that may sometimes be rather 
deceptive. As such, it is interesting to note that the Victorian Act 
gave artists and academics an immunity that was not extended to 
religious practitioners in the original draft. One could not severely 
offend someone if one did it for religious purposes, but one could, 
and still can, do it for artistic ones.64 Such exemptions are extremely 
problematic. Certain forms of communication, including academic 
and artistic, are granted full immunity to religious vilification. This 
creates some elitist distinctions that privilege the eloquent speaker 
over others so that only certain forms of expression are restricted.65 
The then Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, George Pell, 
correctly pointed out the strange anomaly and elitism of this 
provision: 
 
 63. Robert Forsyth, Dangerous Protections: How Some Ways of Protecting the Freedom 
of Religion May Actually Diminish Religious Freedom, Address at the Third Acton Lecture on 
Religion and Freedom (Sep. 24, 2001), in CENTRE FOR INDEP. STUD. 9 (2001). 
 64. Id. at 11. 
 65. Harrison, supra note 15, at 88. 
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Citizens rightly resent any attempt to limit their free speech more 
than the free speech of their ‘betters.’ It is quite unfair that the 
deliberate conduct of the artist or the politician is exempted but the 
clumsy contribution of the less educated is made criminal. If any 
serious movement for racial and religious persecution were to gain 
momentum, then no doubt it would have been led and nourished 
by certain misguided politicians, academics and artists.66 
In the Catch the Fire case, the finding that a seminar on Islam was 
not a “balanced discussion” rested on the broader assumption that 
Pastor Scot unduly engaged in a “unilateral uncontested dialogue.” 
Such an idea that one ought to provide a “balanced” or “contested” 
discussion to escape the accusation of “vilification” is, quite frankly, 
absurd. According to Dr. Ian Spry QC, at the seminar, Pastor Scot 
had simply drawn attention to “a number of disturbing statements in 
the Koran, as well as a number of other statements in the Koran of 
which he ‘expressed approval.’” Hence, in Dr. Spry’s opinion, 
The seminar appears on balance to have been a reasonable 
presentation. There are undoubtedly profoundly disturbing 
statements within the Koran, and some of the extreme statements 
made by Moslems within Australia are even more disturbing. 
Needless to say, discussion of these matters should not be 
repressed.67 
Nevertheless, Professor Garry Bouma, an expert witness for the 
ICV, thought that the seminar had been unbalanced.68 He wrote 
later in the Victorian newspaper The Age that the RRTA had the 
positive effect of enforcing “the need for religious groups to behave 
honestly and honorably with each other,” thus creating what he 
claims to constitute “religious maturity.”69 But in reality one could 
easily argue that what this kind of “maturity” actually implies is no 
more than the artificial creation of a debating club of pedantic 
academics, who may sometimes adopt the art of obscure rhetoric in  
 
 
 66. Gary Bouma, THE AGE (Mar. 16, 2001), http://www.theage.com.au. 
 67. Spry, supra note 58, at 65. 
 68. Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT 2510 ¶ 149 
(Austl.). 
 69. Gary Bouma, Why Costello is Wrong on Vilification Laws, THE AGE (June 1, 2004), 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/05/31/1085855495283.html. 
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order to avoid a more open and robust debate on any particular 
issue. 
V. RELIGIOUS VILIFICATION LAWS AND POSTMODERN THEORY 
As seen before, the truth of a statement is irrelevant for the 
purposes of religious vilification. If the truth of a statement cannot 
be used as a defense, why then should the truth itself be irrelevant 
for the purposes of religious vilification? The answer seems to be 
based on the fact that such laws rely on a postmodern assumption 
that truth is socially construed, and therefore irrelevant; that truth as 
such is related to the particularities of an individual’s culture, 
religion, and social context. Since truth is relative to social context, 
then it is also “morally wrong” to criticize someone else’s values or 
beliefs no matter how obnoxious these values and beliefs might be. 
Although it is not really easy to define the term postmodernism, 
one may loosely define it as a label for a range of theoretical 
challenges to the objectivity of truth and knowledge. In Western 
societies, the idea of objective truth is traditionally related to the 
understanding about the relationship between the real world and 
statements that correspond to the real world. Postmodernists deny 
this tradition by claiming that there is no such thing as objective 
truth. For them, everything one knows is merely the subject of social 
context and, accordingly, cultural surroundings. This so being, 
religious vilification laws appear to be inspired by the work of 
postmodern scholars such as Stanley Fish, who claims that humanity 
has never been oriented toward “the truth,” and that “there is no 
such thing as free speech.”70 On the contrary, Fish argues, any claim 
to free speech is actually invalid because every speech serves an 
“instrumental purpose” that eventually allows its regulation by the 
government in the public sphere.71 
 
 70. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH (1994). 
 71. Peter Lowe and Annemarie Jonson, “There Is No Such Thing as Free Speech”: An 
Interview with Stanley Fish, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN. REV. (Feb. 1998), 
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-February-1998/fish.html. Fish 
goes on to say:  
When one speaks to another person, it is usually for an instrumental purpose: you are 
trying to get someone to do something, you are trying to urge an idea and, down the 
road, a course of action. There are reasons for which speech exists and it is in that 
sense that I say that there is no such thing as “free speech,” that is, speech that has 
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Since the RRTA claims that the truth cannot be relied as a 
defense from the accusation of religious vilification, this law 
basically reflects the postmodern rejection or indifference to all 
matters of truth and objectivity. Such law is grounded on the 
skepticism of truth, which in turn is deemed relative and contingent 
to group thinking and social experience.72 Accordingly, what one 
takes for the “truth” is no more than his or her personal opinion and 
nothing else. In sum, what “truth” means under the postmodern 
reading of reality is no more than a Christian perspective, a Muslim 
perspective, a Hindu perspective, and so forth. Each of these 
“perspectives” must be conditioned and locked in the person’s own 
sphere of “religiosity,” so that any claim to universal truth can be 
dismissed as naïve at best and deceptive at worst, as a mere attempt 
by one of these groups to “impose” their own perspective upon the 
others. 
VI. RELIGIOUS VILIFICATION LAW: BLASPHEMY LAW BY STEALTH? 
One reasonable concern regarding vilification law is that some 
religious bodies could exploit such anti-incitement mechanisms to 
secure immunity from appropriate public scrutiny of their beliefs and 
practices. This concern has been proven to be correct, and the Catch 
the Fire case is merely one example. Whatever the merits of the 
arguments presented by the respondents in the case of the two 
pastors in that case, the regrettable episode vividly illustrates the 
great potential for exploitation of any such mechanisms by religious 
extremists who are reluctant to endure public criticism of their 
beliefs. 
Of course, that case had many elements of a set-up, including the 
pre-arrangement by the Islamic Council of Victoria to send several 
 
its rationale nothing more than its own production. 
Id. 
 72. Charles Rice argues on the absurdity of such postmodern skepticism:  
One who says we can never be certain of anything contradicts himself because he is 
certain of that proposition. If he says instead that he is not sure he can be sure of 
anything, he admits at least that he is sure he is not sure. Or some will say that all 
propositions are meaningless unless they can be empirically verified. But that 
statement itself cannot be empirically verified.  
CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED IT 132 
(1999). 
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anonymous informants to a seminar held privately in a Melbourne 
church, followed by the coordinated lodgment of a formal complaint 
with the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT).73 
Another discomforting conclusion one can draw from the episode is 
that in the eyes of such a governmental agency, the rights of some 
religious people to engage in free speech may be less important than 
others. This perceived desire to shelter particular groups from public 
examination should be of great concern to all Australians, including 
those of strong religious belief and those with none. 
Although we should not allow our rights and freedoms to be 
undermined by the inflated sensitivities of any religious group, 
vilifications laws may actually serve the undesirable purpose of 
creating a new and more disguised form of blasphemy law, which 
allows some religionists to make others keener to accept a vast range 
of religious restrictions to their freedoms in return for “being left 
alone.” This is particularly so when one takes into account that the 
RRTA was enacted at the insistence of the local Islamic community 
in Victoria.74 
Throughout the Muslim world, “accusations of blasphemy or 
insulting Islam are used systematically in much of that world to send 
individuals to jail or to bring about intimidation through threats, 
beatings and killings.”75 It is applied against Muslims who are 
judged to be apostates and against non-Muslims when they are 
considered to have lost the “protection” afforded to them under the 
dhimma pact, or covenant protection.76 Under Islamic jurisprudence, 
any such transgressions, if performed by Muslims, are regarded as 
evidence of apostasy, a capital offense.77 Conversely, if the 
transgression is attributed to a non-Muslim living under Islamic rule, 
this is interpreted as annulling their dhimmi condition, for which the 
 
 73. Sheehan, supra note 62. 
 74. Spry, supra note 58, at 64. 
 75. Paul Marshall, Blasphemy and Free Speech, 41(2) IMPRIMIS 2 (2012). In these Islamic 
countries even Muslims themselves may be persecuted if they do not endorse the official 
interpretation of Islam: “Sunni, Shia and Sufi Muslims may be persecuted for differing from the 
version of Islam promulgated by locally hegemonic religious authorities. . . . Iran represses 
Sunnis and Suffis. In Egypt, Shia leaders have been imprisoned and tortured.” Id. at 3. 
 76. Mark Durie, Sleeping into Sharia: Hate Speech and Islamic Blasphemy Strictures, 15 INT’L 
TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 394, 396 (2012). 
 77. Id. 
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death penalty is also applied.78 The offending dhimmi must be treated 
as “an object of war,” which according to Sharia law means 
“confiscation of property, enslavement (of wife and children), and 
death.”79 As Michael Nazir-Ali points out, “there is unanimity 
among the lawyers that anyone who blasphemes against Muhammad 
is to be put to death, although how the execution is to be carried out 
varies from one person to another.”80 
According to recent legal scholarship, the execution of apostates 
from Islam is sanctioned by all five dominant streams of Islamic law, 
namely the Hanafi (Sunni), Shafi’i (Sunni), Maliki (Sunni), Hanbali 
(Sunni) and Ja’fari (Shi’a) legal codes, under which the State may 
impose the death penalty as a mandatory punishment (“hudud”) 
against adult male converts from Islam (“irtidad”).81 For adult 
women, death is prescribed by three of the five Islamic schools. The 
exceptions are Hanafi Islam, which allows for permanent 
imprisonment (until the woman recants), and Ja’fari Islam, which 
allows imprisonment and beating with rods (until death or 
recantation).82 With the exception of Ja’fari Islam, the death penalty 
is also applied to child apostates under Sharia law, with the penalty 
typically delayed until attainment of maturity. Even more unsettling 
is the fact that under three of the five Islamic legal codes, apostasy 
need not be articulated verbally to incur mandatory punishment; 
even inward apostasy is punishable.83 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Michael Nazir-Ali, Islamic Law, Fundamental Freedoms, and Social Cohesion: Retrospect and 
Prospect, in SHARI’A IN THE WEST 79 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010). 
 81. PATRICK SOOKHDEO, FAITH, POWER AND TERRITORY: A HANDBOOK OF BRITISH ISLAM 24 
(2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. In countries that are subject to Islamic law, writes Charles Moore,  
Believers who reject or insult Islam have no rights. Apostasy is punishable by death. 
In Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, death is the penalty for those who convert from 
Islam to Christianity. In Pakistan, the blasphemy law prescribes death for anyone 
who, even accidentally, defiles the name of Mohammed. In a religion which, unlike 
Christianity, has no idea of a God who himself suffers humiliation, all insult must be 
avenged if the honour of God is to be upheld. Under Islam, Christians and Jews, born 
into their religion, have slightly more rights than apostates. They are ‘dhimmis’, 
second-class citizens who must pay the ‘jiyza’, a sort of poll tax, because of their 
beliefs. Their life is hard. In Saudi Arabia, they cannot worship in public at all, or be 
ministered to by clergy even in private. In Egypt, no Christian university is permitted. 
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Arguably, one of the greatest ironies of religious vilification laws 
is embodied in the fact that their chief beneficiaries end up being a 
small but vocal group of radical Islamists. Of course, it is not entirely 
clear why these radicals should merit any statutory protection from 
“hate speech.”84 On the contrary, some of their most obnoxious 
statements may deserve our revulsion and criticism.85 And yet to 
express any such revulsion or even the slightest indignation may 
incur the risk of being dragged into a court and accused of vilification 
under the existing laws. As Dr. Spry correctly points out: 
Legislation of this kind operates in terrorem. After the ill-founded 
decision of Judge Higgins against Pastor Scot, many will be 
 
In Iran, Christians cannot say their liturgy in the national language. In almost all 
Muslim countries, they are there on sufferance and, increasingly, because of radical 
Islamism, not even on that. 
Charles Moore, Is It Only Mr. Bean Who Resists This New Religious Intolerance?, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(Dec. 11, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/charlesmoore/ 
3613495/Is-it-only-Mr-Bean-who-resists-this-new-religious-intolerance.html. 
 84. Pascal Bruckner comments on the need for the right to criticize Islam:  
The process of questioning remains to be carried out by Islam, which is convinced 
that it is the last revealed religion and hence the only authentic one, with its book 
directly dictated by God to his Prophet. It considers itself not the heir of earlier faiths 
but rather a successor that invalidates them forever. The day when its highest 
authorities recognize the conquering, aggressive nature of their faith, when they ask 
to be pardoned for the holy wars waged in the name of the Qu’ran and for infamies 
committed against infidels, apostates, unbelievers, and women, when they apologize 
for the terrorist attacks that profane the name of God—that will be a day of progress 
and will help dissipate the suspicion that many people legitimately harbor regarding 
this sacrificial monotheism. Criticizing Islam, far from being reactionary, constitutes 
on the contrary the only progressive attitude at a time when millions of Muslims, 
reformers or liberals, aspire to practice their religion in peace without being subjected 
to the dictates of bearded doctrinaires. Banning barbarous customs such as lapidation, 
repudiation, polygamy, and clitoridectomy, subjecting the Qu’ran to hermeneutic 
reason, doing away with objectionable verses about Jews, Christians, and gays and 
appeals for the murder of apostates and infidels, daring to resume the Enlightenment 
movement that arose among Muslim elites at the end of the nineteenth century in the 
Middle East—that is the immense political, philosophical, and theological 
construction project that is opening up . . . . But with a suicidal blindness, our 
continent [i.e., Europe] kneels down before Allah’s madmen and gags and ignores the 
free-thinkers. 
PASCAL BRUCKNER, THE TYRANNY OF GUILT: AN ESSAY ON WESTERN MASOCHISM 46–47 (2011). 
 85. For example, in January 2009, a Muslim cleric from Melbourne instructed his male 
married followers to hit and force sex upon their disobedient wives. It’s OK to Hit Your Wife, Says 
Melbourne Cleric Samir Abu Hamza, THE AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/wife-hitting-lecture-taken-out-of-context/story-
e6frg6of-1111118630373. Statements such as this clearly deserve our revulsion and indignation. 
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unprepared to make critical comments or give warnings about 
Islam and about Moslems in Australia or abroad, however well-
based those comments or warnings would be. In particular, in a 
world where Moslem terrorists are active, and where threats are 
made by them against Australia, and where some Moslem leaders 
in Australia express sympathy with terrorists, the ability of 
Australia to defend themselves and their interests is seriously 
diminished.86 
VII. WHY RELIGIONS ARE NOT EQUAL IN THE RECOGNITION OF BASIC 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
What a person believes has a direct influence over what he or she 
becomes, and the same must be applied to his or her society. Culture 
is created as an expression of beliefs, and the values a society holds 
is dependent upon its people’s religious views. For Rex M. Rogers, 
religion is the primary source of culture, because culture is basically 
“religion externalized.”87 Thus, T.S. Elliot famously described 
culture as a “lived religion.”88 Accordingly, if law is the structural 
framework holding a society together, then every law must be based 
on a “religious worldview” that inescapably influences the 
government, education, economics, and so forth. 
Because of its postmodern underpinnings, religious vilification 
laws, such as the RRTA, seem to uphold the rather incredible 
premise of moral equivalence between all religions, so that no 
religious ideas or practices deserve to be strongly criticized and/or 
repudiated. In reality, different religions uphold different values and 
produce rather different kinds of society. Such differences, argues 
Dr. Durie, “extend to understandings of slavery, cast, marriage (e.g., 
monogamy, divorce, polygamy), the death penalty, euthanasia, the 
distribution of wealth, sexual politics, abortion, attitudes to truth, 
the nature of political representation, the whole legal system, and 
warfare. Treating religions as merely a matter of identity is a recipe 
for confusion.”89 
 
 86. Spry, supra note 58, at 65. 
 87. ROGERS, supra note 49, at 48. 
 88. T.S. ELLIOT, NOTES TOWARD A DEFINITION OF CULTURE 30 (1949). 
 89. Mark Durie, Notes on the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act (2001), 
Address at Seminar on Religious Tolerance Laws of the Christian Legal Society of Victoria (June 
2, 2005). 
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In terms of our Western values and traditions, one must consider 
how Christianity played a significant role in the origins and 
development of liberal democracy, individual rights, and the rule of 
law. These values and traditions are associated with Christian 
principles, and to deny these principles results in a diminished 
understanding of our own culture and the values that underpin it. 
Under this Judeo-Christian framework, when citizens in the West 
are said to be “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights,” they are entitled not to a “theocracy” but rather to the 
preservation of these basic rights and freedoms, no matter their 
ideological or religious convictions. Conversely, Thomas Jefferson 
asked rhetorically: “[How] [c]an the liberties of a nation be thought 
secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in 
the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God?”90 
Statements such as these had an undeniable impact on the 
development of Western democracy. According to Sanford Lakoff, 
who is Emeritus Professor of Political Theory at the University of 
California, San Diego, 
The Christian teaching with the greatest implications for democracy 
is the belief that because humanity is created in the image of God, 
all human beings are of equal worth in the sight of God. Along with 
the Greek Stoic belief in equality as a reflection of the universal 
capacity for reason, this belief shaped an emerging democratic 
consciousness, as Alexis de Tocqueville noted when he observed in 
the introduction to his study of democracy in America that 
Christianity, which has declared all men equal in the sight of God, 
cannot hesitate to acknowledge all citizens equal before the law.91 
Every year a non-governmental institution called Freedom House 
organizes a survey on the situation of democracy and human rights 
throughout the world. These surveys appear to indicate that the 
denial of the broadest range of human rights comes from Marxist-
communist and Muslim-majority countries: “These worse-rated 
countries represent a narrow range of systems of cultures.”92 The 
 
 90. R.J. RUSHDOONY, THE POLITICS OF GUILT AND PITY 135 (1978). 
 91. SANDORF LAKOFF, DEMOCRACY: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE 90 (1996). 
 92. Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and their Global Repercussions, FREEDOM 
HOUSE (2012), http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202012%20Booklet_0. 
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worst violators of human rights are North Korea, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Somalia, 
and Tibet (under Chinese jurisdiction).93 Because of this, it is 
possible that the majority ideologies in these countries are not 
completely democratic, and it is important to openly discuss the 
reasons for this. 
In The Price of Freedom Denied, Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke 
examine the face of resurgent religious fundamentalism and debate 
about the place of religion in the world. Perhaps the most 
controversial finding is that in majority-Muslim countries “religious 
persecution is reported in 100 percent of cases.”94 As they explain, 
“Religious persecution is not only more prevalent in Muslim-
majority countries, but it also generally occurs at a more severe 
level.”95 In these countries, says Paul Marshall, even Muslims 
themselves may be persecuted if they do not endorse the official 
interpretation of Islam: “Sunni, Shia and Sufi Muslims may be 
persecuted for differing from the version of Islam promulgated by 
locally hegemonic religious authorities. . . . Iran represses Sunnis 
and Suffis. In Egypt, Shia leaders have been imprisoned and 
tortured.”96 
VIII. THE TROUBLE WITH “MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY” 
Not so long after the verdict against the two pastors was 
announced, a spokeswoman for the Victorian Premier was found 
stating that the RRTA was working as it should and there’s nothing 
to suggest that this is a bad law.97 If the government of Victoria 
really believes the law is working well regardless of such outcomes, 
then one may assume that these outcomes were not entirely  
 
pdf. 
 93. Worst of the Worst 2012: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, FREEDOM HOUSE (2012), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/worst-worst-2012-worlds-most-
repressive-societies. 
 94. BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 21 (2011). 
 95. Id. at 169. 
 96. Marshall, supra note 75. 
 97. Farrah Tomazin, Victoria’s Vilification Act Easy to Abuse: Carr, THE AGE (June 23, 2005), 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/victorias-vilification-act-easy-to-abuse-
carr/2005/06/22/1119321792051.html. 
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unintended. What would the purpose behind such religious 
vilification law therefore be? 
Prior to the enactment of the Victorian legislation, in a message 
printed in a Discussion Paper, the then Labor Premier Steve Bracks 
declared: “Victoria’s most multicultural state and the diversity of its 
people is a great asset. Respect for this cultural diversity is vitally 
important to our community.”98 This being so, in reading the 
preamble of the RRTA, one finds the important statement that the 
legislation has been designed to advance a so-called “multicultural 
democracy.”99 
Naturally, it is not hard to see the internal tensions within these 
ideas of “multiculturalism” and “democracy.” A true democracy 
should be committed not so much to “cultural diversity,” but instead 
to the status of the citizen as a human being endowed with basic 
rights to life, liberty, and property. And yet, securing the conditions 
of a multicultural society and preserving the basic rights of the 
individual are potentially competing principles that may have to be 
traded off against each other in each particular case. 
In his seminal work on how democracies effectively work, Dr. 
Robert Dahl, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Yale 
University, identified the underlying conditions in a country that 
would be favorable to the stability of democratic institutions. 
“Where these conditions are weakly absent democracy is unlikely to 
exist, or if it does, its existence is likely to be precarious.”100 Among 
conditions identified as “essential for the stability of democracy,” he 
identified “weak sub-cultural pluralism” and “democratic beliefs and 
political culture.”101 According to Professor Dahl, “democratic 
political institutions are more likely to develop and endure in a 
country that is culturally fairly homogeneous and less likely in a 
country with sharply differentiated and conflicting subcultures.”102 
Conversely, “cultural diversity,” he argued, threatens to generate 
 
 98. Jenny Stokes, Religious Vilification Laws in Victoria – Background to the Law and Cases, 
SALT SHAKERS (June 2005), http://www.saltshakers.org.au/images/stories/attachments/ 
252_300269_ARTICLES_ON_VILIFICATION.pdf. 
 99. See Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) s 4(1)(a) (Austl.). 
 100. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 147 (1998). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 150–51. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 9:54 AM 
457 The Unconstitutionality of Religious Vilification Laws in Australia 
 479 
intractable social conflicts whereby democratic institutions would be 
simply impossible to be maintained. The following passage in his 
seminal On Democracy explains the potentially adverse consequences 
of state-sponsored “multiculturalism”: 
Distinctive cultures are often formed around differences in 
language, religion, race, ethnic identity, and sometimes ideology. 
Members share a common identity and emotional ties; they sharply 
distinguish “us” from “them.” They turn toward other members of 
their group for personal relationships: friends, companions, 
marriage partners, neighbors, guests. They often engage in 
ceremonies and rituals that, among other things, define their group 
boundaries. In all these ways and others, a culture may become 
virtually a “way of life” for its members, a country within a country; 
a nation within a nation. In this case society is, so to speak, 
vertically stratified. 
Hence, Professor Dahl concludes: 
Cultural conflicts can erupt into the political arena, and typically 
they do: over religion, language, and dress codes in schools, for 
example; . . . or discriminatory practices by one group against 
another; or whether the government should support religion or 
religious institutions, and if so, which ones and in what ways; or 
practices by one group that another finds deeply offensive and 
wishes to prohibit, such as . . . cow slaughter, or “indecent” 
dress’, or how and whether territorial and political boundaries 
should be adapted to fit group desires and demands. And so on. 
And on. . . . Issues like these pose a special problem for 
democracy. Adherents of a particular culture often view their 
political demands as matters of principle, deep religious or quasi-
religious conviction, cultural preservation, or group survival. As a 
consequence, they consider their demands too crucial to allow for 
compromise. They are nonnegotiable. Yet under a peaceful 
democratic process, settling political conflicts generally requires 
negotiation, conciliation, compromise.103 
What Professor Dahl suggests is that some religious allegiances 
may be non-negotiable, whereas democracy requires otherwise. This 
being the case, a more successful and stable democratic society 
“cannot be radically multicultural but depends for its successful 
 
 103. Id. at 150. 
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renewal across the generations on an undergirding culture that is 
held in common.”104 This common culture, as John Gray points out, 
“needs not encompass a shared religion and it certainly need not to 
presuppose ethnic homogeneity, but it does demand widespread 
acceptance of certain norms and conventions of behavior and, in our 
times, it typically expressed a shared sense of nationality.”105 By 
contrast, it would appear that locking people into enclaves of religion 
or ethnicity will not necessarily advance the inherent values of 
democracy and the rule of law.106 After all, a basic precondition for 
democratic participation is precisely that all citizens must share 
common democratic values, and that they must be able to 
communicate with others in the common language of their other 
fellow citizens. 
In addition, it is always important to restate that democracy itself 
is as much a socio-political achievement as it is a legal-institutional 
one. In other words, democracy depends on cultural values that are 
historically linked to cultural traditions that are transmitted to 
citizens from generation to generation.107 This is all obviously very 
important, although in Considerations on Representative Government, 
John Stuart Mill reminds us that some peoples may be culturally 
unqualified to accept the deeper moral implications of living under a 
democratic government.108 Mill developed his critical argument on 
 
 104. JOHN GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE 36 (2007). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Pascal Bruckner offers this insightful, though rather polemical, criticism of 
multiculturalism:  
[U]nder the cover of respecting cultural or religious differences (the basic credo of 
multiculturalism), individuals are locked into an ethnic or racial definition, cast back 
into the trap from which we were trying to free them. Their good progressive friends 
set blacks and Arabs, forever prisoners of their history, back into the context of their 
former domination and subject them to ethnic chauvinism. As during the colonial era, 
they are put under house arrest in their skins, in their origins. By a perverse dialectic, 
the prejudices that were to be eradicated are reinforced: we can no longer see others 
as equals but must see them as . . . victims of perpetual oppression whose past 
ordeals interest us more than their present merits. 
BRUCKNER, supra note 84, at 145. 
 107. Jeffrie G. Murphy reminds us that “[v]alues come to us trailing their historical past; 
and when we attempt to cut all [cultural] links to that past we risk cutting the life lines on 
which those values essentially depend.” Jeffrie Murphy, Constitutionalism, Moral Skepticism, and 
Religious Belief, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 
1988). 
 108. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 329 (1952). 
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the basis of his personal understanding that the realization of 
democratic government is strongly “determined by social 
circumstances.”109 He considered that these circumstances are 
considerably malleable and could therefore be changed for either 
better or worse.110 Mill also believed that people could be taught to 
behave in a democratic manner.111 And yet, he kept insisting that 
some patterns of cultural behavior are essential in determining the 
realization of democracy. As Mill explained: 
The people for whom the form of government is intended must be 
willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an 
insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. . . . A rude 
people . . . may be unable to practice the forbearance which . . . 
representative government demands: their passions may be too 
violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forego private 
conflict, and leave to the laws the avenging of their real or supposed 
wrongs.112 
 This brings us to the matter of multiculturalism. An idea that 
started out in the sixties and early seventies, multiculturalism 
initially had the reasonable goal of including minority groups in 
Western societies. Nowadays, it is difficult to talk candidly about 
such an idea since the multicultural project has become no longer a 
fair understanding of other cultures, but a postmodern ideology 
aiming at the dilution of Western values and traditions.113 
 
 109. Id. at 331. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 329. 
 113. Irving Kristol argues:  
It is in its most intense and extreme form that multiculturalism . . . is propagated 
by a coalition of nationalist-racist blacks, radical feminists, gays and lesbians, and 
handful of aspiring demagogues who claim to present various ethnic minorities. . . . 
This coalition’s multiculturalism is an ideology whose educational program is 
subordinated to a political program that is, above all, anti-American and anti-
Western. It’s no exaggeration to say that these campus radicals (professors as well as 
students), having given up on the ‘class struggle’—the American workers all being 
conscientious objectors—have now moved to an agenda of ethnic-racial conflict. The 
agenda, in its educational dimension, has as its explicit purpose to induce the minds 
and sensibilities of minority students a ‘Third World consciousness’—that is the very 
phrase they use. In practice, this means an effort to persuade minority students to be 
contemptuous of and hostile to America and Western civilization as a whole, 
interpreted as an age-old system of oppression, colonialism, and exploitation. What 
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According to Professor Huntington, multiculturalism has now 
become an “anti-Western ideology” opposed to “Eurocentric 
concepts of democratic principles, culture, and identity.”114 Instead 
of attempting to globalize Western cultural values, such as universal 
human rights and individual freedom, such values are regarded as 
“ethnocentric products of Western history.” 
In place of Western universalism, multiculturalists tell us to 
accept and embrace cultural relativism. Although the concept of 
cultural relativism preserves a certain gloss of tolerance and respect 
for other cultures, such a plea for acceptance and open-mindedness 
ceases when it comes to Western culture, whose history 
multiculturalists tend to “regard as little more than a crime against 
the rest of humanity. We cannot judge other cultures but we must 
condemn our own.”115 Indeed, the same multiculturalists who 
demand our unconditional respect for any existing culture, tend to 
exhibit a blatant disrespect for our own values and traditions.116 
Such multiculturalism stands for a form of anti-Western ideology 
that promotes moral relativism and refuses to admit that culture (at 
the extremes) produces either a democratic society or social 
oppression, for instance, against women and minorities.117 
There is also little doubt that multiculturalism may pose a 
considerable challenge to the idea of national identity. 
Multiculturalism elevates racial, ethnic, gender, religious, and other 
sub-national identities over common national identity and equal 
rights for all citizens. As advocated by some elite elements and 
special-interest groups, multiculturalism favors a new form of 
 
these radicals blandly call multiculturalism is as much a ‘war against the West’ as 
Nazism and Stalinism ever were. 
IRVING KRISTOL, NEOCONSERVATISM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 52 (1995). 
 114. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? AMERICA’S GREAT DEBATE 173 (2004). 
 115. Keith Windschuttle, September 11 and the End of Ideology, in BLAMING OURSELVES: 
SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE AGONY OF THE LEFT 198 (Imre Salusinszky & Gregory Melleuish eds., 
2002). 
 116. Hence, writes Ravi Zacharias, Christianity has become a “free game for ridicule and 
analysis by social critics, and is afforded no protection from hate and hostility by our so-called 
multicultural society.” RAVI ZACHARIAS, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: RESTORING THE SOUL IN A 
DISINTEGRATING CULTURE 214 (1996). 
 117. For a broad analysis of how culture shapes values such as democracy, economic 
development and human rights, see LAWRENCE E. HARRISON & SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, 
CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (2000). 
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cultural apartheid, or social fragmentation, whereby ethnic 
differences are intensified and the social factors which have united 
the people and promoted immigrant assimilation are weakened. This 
is why multicultural policies have become a major factor for the 
increased tendency of some immigrant groups to actually maintain 
their primary loyalty to their original cultural identities, rather than 
attempt to embrace the cultural identity of their new nation. As a 
result of such multicultural policies, Roger Scruton comments, “[a]ll 
criticism of minority cultures is censured out of public debate, and 
new-comers quickly conclude that it is possible to reside in a . . . 
state as an antagonist and still enjoy all the rights and privileges that 
are the reward of citizenship.”118 
Naturally, some may claim that those immigrants would be the 
first to support state-sponsored multiculturalism. However, it is also 
possible to suggest that the main impetus for multiculturalism does 
not come from the immigrants but from the local intellectual elite as 
well as the more powerful individuals within the cultural groups.119 
Apart from these privileged individuals, common people gain very 
little from the amorphous atmosphere of multiculturalism save 
bewilderment and the loss of any sense of common national identity. 
Scruton thus explains that such loss of national identity brought 
about by multiculturalism has been causing some Western nations 
to fragment into small enclaves of ethnicity. “If people come from 
immigrant backgrounds that preserve the memory of a religious law, 
they will often revert to a religious experience of membership, and 
define themselves in opposition to the territorial jurisdiction by 
which they are ostensibly governed.”120  
 
 118. ROGER SCRUTON, THE WEST AND THE REST: GLOBALIZATION AND THE TERRORIST 
THREAT 63 ( 2002). 
 119. According to Tammy Bruce:  
Framing arguments about race as arguments about culture has the additional 
advantage for the Left of removing the individual from the scene entirely. Ironically, it also 
reinforces what is supposedly being resisted: the isolation of people because of their 
race. By defining society not as an entity made up of individual people but as a 
collection of cultures—such as white culture, black culture, Hispanic culture—the 
Left effectively isolates us, whether we like it or not, into special-interest groups. The 
culture has the identity, eclipsing the individual. We’re no longer individuals with 
unique minds and talents; we’re defined instead by the color of our skin, by the 
country in which we were born, by the religion we practice. 
TAMMY BRUCE, THE NEW THOUGHT POLICE 166 (2001). 
 120. SCRUTON, supra note 118, at 68. 
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For example, in Britain, a study commissioned by Policy 
Exchange has found that multicultural policies have alienated entire 
generations of young Muslims.121 It has made them increasingly 
more radical and anti-Western—much more so than their parents’ 
generation.122 This study also reveals that four out of ten young 
British Muslims desire to live under Sharia law and that they support 
punishment by death for Muslims who convert to another religion. 
Furthermore, thirteen percent of all young British Muslims have 
expressed a sincere admiration of terrorist organizations such as 
Hamas and Hezbollah, which are prepared to “fight the West.” 
According to Dr. Munira Mirza, the scholar who conducted the 
survey, “the emergence of a strong Muslim identity in Britain is, in 
part, a result of multicultural policies implemented since the 1980s 
which have emphasized difference at the expense of shared national 
identity and divided people along ethnic, religious and cultural 
lines.”123 
 
 121. Multiculturalism Drives Young Muslims to Shun British Values, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 29, 
2007), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-432075/Multiculturalism-drives-young-
Muslims-shun-British-values.html#. 
 122. Wolfgang Kasper explains how multiculturalism may contribute to the radicalization 
of the children and grandchildren of immigrants:  
The task of integrating immigrants does not stop with the first generation, in 
particular if they hail from non-Western origins. The first generation typically focuses 
on getting on within the existing system, but the second and third generations tend 
to challenge the existing regime. We have already observed a wave of 
multiculturalism and the politicization of cultural change. Playing the multicultural 
card brought political advantage to the leaders who promoted the vision of 
multiculturalism, whether they were spokesmen for immigrant groups or politicians 
who sought migrant-group support in elections. Leaders with more traditional 
theories about government and social harmony have opposed the new 
multiculturalism. 
WOLFGANG KASPER, THE MERITS OF WESTERN CIVILISATION: AN INTRODUCTION 73 (2011). 
 123. See Murphy, supra note 107. As further evidence that part of the Muslim population in 
Britain has been radicalized and unwilling to accept the norms that rule a democratic society, 
just after Ayatollah Khomeini on February 14, 1989, issued his fatwa condemning to death 
Salman Rushdie for writing Satanic Verses (1988), there were many British Muslims who wished 
to carry the death sentence against the writer. John Gray comments:  
The evidence of the Rushdie affair is that a minority of fundamentalist Muslims are 
unwilling to accept the norms that govern civil society in Britain. Here a policy of 
toleration must be willing to be repressive—to arrest and charge those who have 
made death threats against the writer or those associated with him. Toleration does 
not mandate turning a blind eye on those who flout the practices of freedom of 
expression that are among the central defining elements of liberal society in Britain: it 
mandates their suppression. . . . Difference of religious belief and of irreligion, of 
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The media has recently reported a violent protest on the streets 
of Sydney by hundreds of hardcore Muslims who attacked the police 
and were equipped with banners and posters with slogans such as 
“Sharia will dominate the world” and “Behead all those who insult 
the Prophet.”124 These extremists may live in Australia but they are 
“militant Muslims above all else, above all reason, above all restraint, 
and above [the] law[].”125 Indeed, the Sydney affair seems to 
indicate that a minority of Muslims are unwilling to accept the 
norms that govern civil society in Australia. Of course, these radical 
religionists would have more to think about if we resisted their 
demands rather than caving to them. Attempting to appease the 
radicals only reinforces their bigotry and hatred toward the West.126 
As John Gray points out, “toleration does not mandate turning a 
blind eye on those who flout the practices of freedom of expression 
that are among the central defining elements of liberal society in 
[Australia]: it mandates their suppression.”127 Instead, some 
Australian intellectuals and politicians are quite inclined to respond 
to such events, or just the threat of violence, with further 
appeasement and self-censorship. 
One of the key questions facing Western societies is how 
Muslims will adapt to living as minority communities in non-Muslim 
polities. Abdullah Saeed, who is Sultan of Oman Professor of Arab 
and Islamic Studies at the University of Melbourne, sees Muslim 
views on living in the West as comprising three different categories. 
 
conceptions of the good and of ethnic inheritance may be many and significant, and 
yet the inhabitants of a country may yet be recognizably practitioners of a shared form 
of life. The kind of diversity that is incompatible with civil society in Britain is that 
which rejects the constitutive practices that give it its identity. Central among these 
are freedom of expression and its precondition the rule of law. Cultural traditions that 
repudiate these practices cannot be objects of toleration for liberal civil society in 
Britain or anywhere else. 
GRAY, supra note 104, at 8. 
 124. Mother of Toddler Holding Up ‘Beheading’ Poster at Sydney Protest Turns Herself In, THE 
AUSTRALIAN (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/mother-of-
toddler-holding-up-beheading-poster-at-sydney-protest-turns-herself-in/story-e6frg6nf-
1226476342768. 
 125. Mervyn F. Bendle, Violent Islamism Erupts on the Streets of Sydney, NEWS WKLY. (Sept. 
29, 2012), http://www.newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=5334. 
 126. IBN WARRAQ, WHY THE WEST IS BEST: A MUSLIM APOSTATE’S DEFENSE OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 211–12 (2011). 
 127. GRAY, supra note 104, at 37. 
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First, there are those Muslims who think “a Muslim cannot be 
bound by a national constitution that allows interest, alcohol, and 
[any] other behavior which contradicts Islamic teachings.”128 
Second, there are those who are still “undecided as to whether they 
want to be full members of Western societies.”129 Finally, there are 
Muslims who are quite happy to live in Western countries, because 
they believe that, in a certain way, the Western legal systems are 
already “Islamic” insofar as they accept certain Islamic notions of 
justice and morality and allow them to exercise their basic religious 
duties.130 Saeed believes that most Muslims living in Australia 
would fall into the third category: they believe the country’s “secular 
law” can be tolerated in their daily lives, “provided . . . that the law 
of the land supports [Islamic] notions of justice . . . and allows 
Muslims religious freedom to practice their fundamental beliefs.”131 
Naturally, there are numerous potential points of tension in 
placing religion as a pre-condition for a citizen’s loyalty to the 
“secular law” of a nation. Australia and other Western countries are 
facing two serious threats. The first threat is extra-legal intimidation 
of a kind already endemic in the Islamic world and increasing in 
Europe. Australians, including many in conservative circles, have 
been held back from such an effort to help Muslims examine their 
own culture and beliefs out of fear, because they think it is much too 
dangerous to criticize the beliefs of those who might kill in the name 
of their god. The second threat comes from the criminalization of 
criticizing radical Islam through the encroachment of de facto 
blasphemy laws. Indeed, one of the most obvious efforts to appease 
radical Islam has been the enforcement of draconian laws on the 
grounds of “religious tolerance.” The Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation is currently taking steps toward outlawing “defamation 
of religion” (i.e., Islam) worldwide, and these efforts have, in effect, 
been abetted by Australian politicians under the guise of suppressing 
“hate speech.”132 
 
 128. Abdullah Saeed, Reflections on the Establishment of Shari’a Courts in Australia, in SHARI’A 
IN THE WEST 233 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 235. 
 131. Id. at 233. 
 132. WARRAQ, supra note 126, at 211. 
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Rather than encouraging religious extremists in their efforts to 
legally stifle criticism and debate, Western authorities should firmly 
defend freedom of speech and freedom of expression. And yet, there 
is an ongoing demand for governments to provide “special rights” to 
religious groups on the basis of multiculturalism.133 These groups 
would have their own “societal cultures” that, according to Will 
Kymlicka, provide their “members with meaningful ways to life 
across the full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing 
both public and private spheres.”134 Because cultures would play 
such a pervasive role in the lives of their individual members, 
multiculturalists claim that these groups should be accorded special 
rights or privileges—otherwise their minority status would be 
endangered by the dominant culture.135 
 
 133. Professor Richard Thompson Ford of Stanford Law School comments on the grant of 
special rights to minority groups by multiculturalists:  
[M]ulticulturalists sought to extend civil rights laws to ‘cultural difference’ in the 
1980s and 1990s. In its cruder iterations, legal multiculturalism held that racial 
groups were defined by their distinctive cultural norms and practices: for example, 
black culture comprised Ebonics, ‘colored people’s time,’ hip-hop clothing styles, 
braided hairstyles, and dreadlocks. It seemed to follow that discrimination on the 
basis of these styles, affectations, and habits was as bad as discrimination on the basis 
of race. Legal multiculturalism drew on a strong psychotherapeutic stand in civil 
rights activism, which focused less on tangible economic or political injury than on 
self-esteem and dignity. Multiculturalists insisted that because minority cultural 
practices were essential to individual identity and self-worth, a society that favored 
dominant cultural norms and practices was not only narrow but unjust. 
Multiculturalists were among the first to grapple with the challenges of porous 
national borders, global mobility, and an ethnically diverse society, but the civil rights 
approach to these challenges supplied simplistic and formulaic answers to complex 
questions. The application of civil rights model to ‘culture’ treated contestable 
political conflicts over norms and morality and struggles over the distribution of 
resources as civil rights violations.”  
RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR 
EQUALITY 18 (2011). 
 134. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
76 (1995). 
 135. See Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 71 SOC. 
RES. 529–48 (1994). To be fair, some multiculturalists do not claim that cultural groups should 
have special rights, but rather that such groups—even illiberal ones that violate their individual 
members’ rights, requiring them to conform to group beliefs or norms—have the right to be 
“left alone” in a liberal society, which of course is another highly controversial postulation. 
Chandran Kukathas, Are There any Cultural Rights?, 20(1) POL. THEORY 105–39 (1992). 
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But there are numerous and serious problems with the concept 
of group rights as advocated by multiculturalists and affirmative-
action activists. Rights are not a single indivisible entity. They can 
and do conflict. Too much emphasis on group rights may easily 
result in the reduction of basic rights to some individuals. Indeed, 
group rights that determine a person’s rights on the basis of 
belonging to any ethnic, cultural, or religious group may eventually 
reduce the rights of the individual in that these rights stem directly 
from the group. If the individual does not belong to the group, his or 
her rights are automatically reduced or curtailed.136 Furthermore, in 
prioritizing group rights at the expense of individual rights, 
multicultural policies tend to facilitate the oppression of women and 
other less powerful members of these different social groups.137 Of 
course, special rights or affirmative action to special groups 
particularly ignore the basic fact that, with many of us living in 
Western pluralistic societies, our own ethnic inheritance is actually 
quite complex. In our pluralistic societies, John Gray correctly notes: 
[Multiculturalist] policies which result in the creation of group 
rights are inevitably infected with arbitrariness and consequent 
inequity, since the groups selected for privileging are arbitrary, as is 
the determination of who belongs to which group. The nemesis of 
such policies . . . is a sort of reverse apartheid, in which people’s 
opportunities and entitlements are decided by the morally arbitrary 
fact of ethnic origins rather than by their deserts or needs.138 
IX. HOW THE PRESENT “CULTURE OF OFFENDEDNESS” THREATENS OUR 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Given the democratic imperative that all citizens should be 
allowed to speak openly and publicly about their convictions, 
 
 136. ALVIN SCHMIDT, HOW CHRISTIANITY CHANGED THE WORLD 259 (2004). 
 137. As Ibn Warraq points out,  
multiculturalism often ends up providing cover for the most reactionary beliefs and 
practices of other cultures, rather than encouraging the more liberal strands to 
develop. An attentive ear is given mostly to the community elders and traditionalists, 
who often are the least educated and most determined to preserve their power in the 
status quo. Thus we essentially defend the most oppressive beliefs and practices of a 
minority culture, ignoring the denial of rights to its women or children.  
WARRAQ, supra note 126, at 207. 
 138. GRAY, supra note 104, at 35. 
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religious or otherwise, the current notion of offendedness as defined 
by religious vilification laws is dangerously emotive. Those who now 
claim to be offended are speaking of an emotional state on which 
they claim to have received a real or perceived insult to their belief 
system. In such a case, “being offended does not necessarily involve 
any real harm but points instead to the fact that the mere presence of 
such an argument, image, or symbol evokes an emotional response 
of offendedness.”139 Historically, however, the idea of being 
offended meant something quite different. To be offended implied 
something more than just being strongly challenged in our core ideas 
or beliefs. Today, however, as Dr. Albert Mohler Jr. points out, 
“desperate straits are no longer required in order for an individual or 
group to claim the emotional status of offendedness. All that is 
required is often the vaguest notion of emotional distaste at what 
another has said, done, proposed, or presented.”140 
The meaning of “tolerance” has suffered a remarkable 
transformation in our postmodern societies. Tolerance once meant 
to accept other people saying or doing what you personally do not 
agree with. For example, Hugo Grotius advocated religious tolerance 
not on the basis of moral relativism, but because, in his opinion, 
there is no other way to defend truth but by truth itself.141 Likewise, 
John Locke—and most of the great thinkers in the liberal tradition—
did not argue for religious tolerance because of sympathy to other 
beliefs and practices that should be tolerated. Rather, he proposed to 
tolerate other religious beliefs, which, in his opinion, “are false and 
absurd.”142 In other words, Locke thought that everyone is 
individually responsible for finding out “the narrow way and the strait 
gate that leads to heaven.”143 Although he believed that there is 
“only one way to heaven,” Locke argued that “a man cannot be 
forced to be saved,”144 so that “religious truth must be left to 
individual conscience and individual discernment.”145 
 
 139. R. ALBERT MOHLER JR., CULTURE SHIFT: ENGAGING CURRENT ISSUES WITH TIMELESS 
TRUTH 30–31 (2008). 
 140. Id. at 31. 
 141. HUGO GROTIUS, THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 86, 87 (2012). 
 142. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 41 (1991).  
 143. Id. at 19. 
 144. Id. at 32. 
 145. JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 at 98 (1993). 
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Today, however, tolerance has been reinterpreted as a 
psychological attitude that conveys empathy and perhaps even tacit 
consent.146 In contemporary public discussion, argues Frank Furedi, 
“the connection between tolerance and judgment is in danger of 
being lost due to the current cultural obsession with being non-
judgmental.”147 Of course, when the meaning of “tolerance” can be 
distorted to such a manner that it now seems to represent “a 
superficial signifier of acceptance of affirmation of anyone and 
everyone,” such “tolerance” has now become a vice rather than a 
virtue.148 After all, as Furedi also comments, 
 The act of tolerance demands reflection, restraint and a respect 
for the right of other people to find their way to their own 
truth. . . . The most troubling consequence of the rhetorical 
transformation of this term has been its disassociation from 
discrimination and judgment. When tolerance acquires the status of 
a default response connoting approval, people are protected from 
troubling themselves with the challenge of engaging with moral 
dilemmas.149 
The government of every democratic society has a particular 
responsibility to protect free speech and to resist the present 
“culture of offendedness.” Such culture threatens to shut down all 
significant public discourse. Of course, the right of citizens to speak 
publicly about their innermost convictions implies that the 
adherents of other convictions must be equally free to present their 
arguments in an equally public manner. This is the basic cost of 
living in a true democracy—a point made by Salman Rushdie, the 
British novelist who was put under an Islamic death sentence 
because he insulted Muslim sensibilities: 
The idea that any kind of free society can be constructed in which 
people will never be offended or insulted is absurd. So too is the 
notion that people should have the right to call on the law to 
defend them against being offended or insulted. A fundamental 
decision needs to be made: Do we want to live in a free society or 
not? Democracy is not a tea party where people sit around making 
 
 146. Frank Furedi, On Tolerance, 28 POL. 30, 32 (2012). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 31. 
 149. Id. at 32. 
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polite conversation. In democracies people get extremely upset with 
each other. They argue vehemently against each other’s 
positions.150 
Rushdie goes on to conclude: 
 People have the fundamental right to take an argument to the 
point where somebody is offended by what they say. It’s no trick to 
support the free speech of somebody you agree with or to whose 
opinion you are indifferent. The defense of free speech begins at the 
point where people say something you can’t stand. If you can’t 
defend their right to say it, then you don’t believe in free speech. 
You only believe in free speech as long as it doesn’t get up your 
nose.151 
In a democratic society the law should never create a right for 
people not to feel offended. The construction of such a right means 
the end of free speech and the free exchange of ideas.152 And yet, 
vilification laws, as mentioned above, are designed precisely to 
promote this sort of “tolerance” that penalizes any strong 
disapproval of a person’s religious beliefs.153 Given the ongoing 
atmosphere of fear and intimidation that such anti-discrimination 
laws have created, it is not uncommon to find discerning Australians 
who feel afraid of voicing any criticism of someone’s beliefs.154 Of 
course, nobody living in a democratic society should really expect to 
 
 150. Salman Rushdie, Defend the Right to Be Offended, OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 7, 2005), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/article_2331.jsp. 
 151. Id. 
 152. John Stuart Mill explained why the suppression of free speech harms not only the 
speaker but all of humanity:  
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of opinion is, that it is robbing the 
human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the 
opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of 
the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as 
great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error . . . We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring 
to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still. 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33, 41 (2nd ed. 1859). 
 153. Religious vilification laws can be used to fuel more home-grown religious radicalism. 
Indeed, the tactics of intimidating and thereby silencing writers and media outlets has been 
commonly adopted by Islamists in Western societies. 
 154. ALVIN J. SCHMIDT, THE GREAT DIVIDE: THE FAILURE OF ISLAM AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE 
WEST 247 (2004). 
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be exempt from the possibility of facing strong criticism. As the 
European Court of Human Rights noted, 
 Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their 
religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a 
religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be 
exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial 
by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by 
others by doctrines hostile to their faith.155 
Naturally, it is quite understandable that a “multicultural 
society” would prefer people to moderate their claims and avoid 
comments that might cause offense to some religionists. But to 
require the citizens to have their speech controlled by the 
government in the name of tolerance is to go too far. Democracy 
involves the right of citizens to freely express their opinions without 
any fear or threat of punishment. As properly understood, democracy 
presupposes a process of open deliberation about ideas that requires 
freedom of unqualified speech. This kind of freedom is crucial in the 
area of religious debate, which  
“represents the idea that a responsible citizenry must decide these 
questions of faith and truth themselves. Speech is the means by 
which we may offer counterarguments to compete against 
characterizations that we detest, and it forms the means by which 
communities can create their identities, even if it is in opposition 
to, or at the expense of, one another.”156 
In conclusion, freedom of speech is the oxygen that an authentic 
democracy breathes. As a basic tenet of democratic societies, 
freedom of speech involves a critical examination and assessment of 
belief systems in general so that citizens must be free to publicly 
criticize any culture or religion. Although a citizen’s opinion may not 
be the most politically correct, he or she still has the democratic 
right to expose it without the risk of persecution, even if his or her 
opinion is found to be an erring one. Above all, the right to the 
freedom to hold any religion should not become a right to freedom 
from one never being challenged about his or her religious beliefs. 
Conversely, any society that allows the government to create laws 
 
 155. Otto-Preminger Inst. v Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34, 47 (Austl.). 
 156. Harrison, supra note 15, at 96. 
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that clamp down on the citizen’s basic right to free speech has 
already started moving from authentic democracy to a less overtly or 
more disguised form of “elected dictatorship.” 
X. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDITY OF RELIGIOUS VILIFICATION LAWS 
Besides Victoria, only two other Australian states have 
introduced religious vilification laws: Queensland and Tasmania. In 
Queensland, an amendment was passed to the Anti-Discrimination 
Act in 2001, which prohibits conduct that “incites hatred towards, 
serious contempt for, or severe ridicule.”157 This Act is divided into 
two parts and has a section on serious religious vilification that 
imposes fines and a six month prison term.158 
A case in Queensland decided under its vilification law relates to 
an election brochure published during the federal election campaign 
in 2011. Mr. Andrew Lamb, who ran as an independent candidate, 
published a brochure comparing the Bible and the Qur’an.159 An 
injunction was applied by the Chairman of the Islamic Council of 
Queensland to the Anti-Discrimination Commission. The application 
was dismissed by President Sofronoff QC, who observed that  
[o]ne result of acceding to the complainant’s application to restrain 
further publication of the pamphlet would be to deny the voters of 
Moreton any further knowledge that Mr. Lamb holds views of this 
character. Although his holding those views may persuade some to 
vote for him, it is equally likely that this may persuade others to 
deny him their vote.160  
 Thus he concluded: “In my view it is manifestly in the public 
interest that candidates’ views on issues affecting the electorate be 
known.”161 
Whereas the Australian Constitution does not contain a 
comprehensive declaration of human rights, it does deal with some 
rights, and it also contains a few implied rights. Implied rights are 
 
 157. Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act 2011 (Qld) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2001/01AC035.pdf. 
 158. Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act 2011 (Qld) ch 5A, s 131A (Austl.). 
 159. Dean v Lamb [2001] QADT 20 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QADT/2001/20.html. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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those the High Court declared to exist even though they are not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. As such, some rights and 
freedoms are deemed implicit in the basic law.162 Among these 
rights, the High Court determined that implied in the Constitution 
is a freedom of communication on political and public matters.163 
Accordingly, the court found an implied right to freedom of 
communication as a means of invalidating legislation on 
constitutional grounds.164 This freedom operates as a restriction on 
federal and State legislative powers, creating a corresponding 
immunity from legislative control.165 Furthermore, as Hanks, 
Gordon and Hill point out,  
the Court has been prepared to take a relatively broad view of what 
constitutes protected political communication, given the origins of 
the freedom in the constitutional provisions pertaining to . . . 
representative and responsible government. The argument that the 
communication in question is far removed from federal politics 
rarely seems to interest the Court.166  
 In Nationwide News (1992)167 the majority of the High Court 
(Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) relied on an implied 
freedom of communication to strike down a Commonwealth law that 
made it an offence to make statements calculated to bring the 
Industrial Relations Commission or any of its members into 
disrepute.168 The other Justices (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ) 
 
 162. Of course, legal protection is given to rights against discrimination by statute law at 
both Commonwealth and State levels. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.), Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (Austl.), and Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (Austl.) 
prohibit discrimination on the stated grounds and offer a remedy where such discrimination 
occurs. 
 163. See Nationwide News Pty Ltd. v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.); Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (Austl.); Lange v Australian Broad. Corp. 
(1997) 189 CLR 520 (Austl.); Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
 164. See Nationwide News Pty Ltd. 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd. 177 CLR 
106. 
 165. Lange 189 CLR 520. 
 166. PETER HANKS, FRANCES GORDON & GRAEME HILL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 
625 (2012). See, e.g., Hogan v Hinch (2011) 275 ALR 408, [48] (French CJ) [95], [99] (Gummow, 
Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell, JJ) (Austl.). 
 167. Nationwide News Pty Ltd. 177 CLR 1. 
 168. Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 199(1)(d)(ii) (Austl.). See Nationwide News Pty 
Ltd. 177 CLR at 52–53 (Brennan, J), 78–80 (Deane and Toohey, JJ), 95 (Gaudron, J). 
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struck down the law on other grounds.169 In providing rationale for 
his decision, Brennan J stated that democracy implies “legal 
incidents” which are essential to its “effective maintenance.”170 To 
sustain the democratic system required by the Australian 
Constitution, he concluded, “freedom of public discussion of 
political and economic matters is essential: it would be a parody of 
democracy to confer on the people a power to choose their 
Parliament but to deny the freedom of public discussion from which 
the people derive their political judgments.”171 
Nationwide must be read in conjunction with Australian Capital 
Television172—another landmark case involving defamation law, 
whereby the court further implied a freedom of communication in 
respect to political affairs as being derived from the system of 
representative democracy which the Constitution creates. The case 
involved a challenge to the validity of the Political Broadcasts and 
Political Disclosures Act 1991, which prohibited political 
advertisements on radio and television during election periods.173 
The question before the court was whether the Act was invalid as a 
contravention of an implied guarantee of freedom of communication. 
The majority (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) 
held that the Act contravened an implied guarantee of 
communication, at least in relation to public and political 
discussions.174 Justice Brennan fully acknowledged such an 
implication but largely upheld the law on the grounds that it was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of reducing corruption in the 
political process.175 Only Justice Dawson rejected the concept.176 
 
 169. These others members of the Court found the law invalid on the basis that it was not 
within power, the relevant power being the power incidental to § 51(xxxv), relying on 
substantially the same considerations as were taken into account by the members of the Court 
who relied on the implied freedom. See Nationwide News Pty Ltd. 177 CLR at 33–34 (Mason, CJ), 
91 (Dawson, J), 103–05 (McHugh, J). 
 170. Nationwide News Pty Ltd. 177 CLR at 47 (Brennan, J). 
 171. Id. at ¶ 47 (Brennan, J). 
 172. Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (Austl.). 
 173. The Political Broadcasts and Political Disclosures Act 1991 (Cth) (Austl.) had added Part 
IIID to the Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth) (Austl.). Section 95(a) prohibited political advertisements 
on radio or television during federal election periods. There were similar bans for Territory 
elections under section 95(c) and for State and local government elections under section 95(d). 
 174. Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd. 177 CLR at 133–46 (Mason, CJ), 75–76 (Deane 
and Toohey, JJ), 217 (Gaudron, J), 229–35 (McHugh, J). 
 175. Id. at 154, 159–61 (Brennan, J). 
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Justice Gaudron, for instance, described representative democracy as 
a fundamental part of the Australian Constitution, which necessarily 
entails “freedom of political discourse” as the communication not 
only between candidates and electors but also between the members 
of society generally.177 Likewise, Chief Justice Mason held that 
freedom of communication (and discussion) in relation to public and 
political affairs is an indispensable element in democratic society, 
arguing for the “indivisibility” of freedom of communication as 
related to democratic issues: 
Freedom of communication in relation to public affairs and political 
discussion cannot be confined to communications between elected 
representatives and candidates for election on the one hand and the 
electorate on the other. The efficacy of representative government 
depends also upon free communication on such matters between all 
persons, groups and other bodies in the community. . . . The 
concept of freedom to communicate with respect to public affairs 
and political discussion does not lend itself to subdivision. . . . 
The consequence is that the implied freedom of communication 
extends to all matters of public affairs and political discussion, 
notwithstanding that a particular matter at a given time might 
appear to have a primary or immediate connection with the affairs 
of a State, a local authority or a Territory and little or no connection 
with Commonwealth affairs.178 
In Theophanous179 the High Court found an implied right that 
allows a defense to defamatory statements about persons engaged in 
public activity. The implied right was said to create a substantive 
defense in defamation proceedings. The case involved a statement 
made that was defamatory to a member of federal Parliament and 
former chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Migration. He 
sued the newspaper for defamation because it published a letter to 
the editor that attacked his immigration policies and accused him of 
bias arising from his own ethnic background. The majority held that 
it was a defense to the statement to demonstrate that the letter had 
not been published recklessly and that the defendant did not know 
 
 176. Id. at 187. 
 177. Id. at 210 (Gaudron, J). 
 178. Id. at 138–42. 
 179. Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 CLR 104 (Austl.). 
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the defamatory statement was false.180 Furthermore, the Court also 
held that the implied freedom operates not only to invalidate federal 
statutes insofar as they unreasonably impair that freedom but also to  
impose a similar limit on the law of defamation whether embodied 
in the common law or in the statute law of the States.181 
Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd.182 involved a similar 
right to freedom of political communication. The West Australian 
newspaper claimed that six members of the state Legislative Council 
had wasted taxpayers’ money by taking an overseas trip to 
investigate matters that could have been investigated in Western 
Australia. The trip was described as “a junket of mammoth 
proportions.”183 The six Legislative Councilors sued the newspaper 
for defamation, and the defendants pleaded a defense based on the 
implied freedom of political communication. The defamation was 
therefore related to state politicians and connected with a state 
issue, not a federal one. However, the majority (Mason CJ, Deane, 
Toohey and Gaudron, JJ) held that the implied constitutional right to 
freedom of political communication extends to all political 
discussion, including the discussion of state affairs.184 This is 
important because it confirms that the implied right is something 
that the States also need to respect. 
In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp.,185 the High Court decided 
that the right to freedom of political communication encompasses 
information, opinions, and arguments concerning government and 
political matters that affect the people of Australia. The case involved 
some comments made by a television program about the plaintiff, a 
former Prime Minister of New Zealand, who brought an action for 
defamation against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). 
The High Court held that the freedom of communication in relation 
to political and public affairs prevents the Commonwealth, States 
and Territories from introducing legislation that restricts 
communication on political matters, thus restating its original 
 
 180. Id. at 137 (Mason, CJ, Toohey and Gaudron, JJ). 
 181. Id. at 165 (Deane, J). 
 182. Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182 CLR 21 (Austl.). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 232 (Mason, CJ, Toohey and Gaudron, JJ). 
 185. Lange v Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520 (Austl.). 
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position that the Constitution conceives a system of representative 
government that implies a “freedom of communication on matters of 
government and politics.”186 
 Finally, in Coleman,187 the majority of the Court considered that a 
law cannot, consistent with the implied freedom of political 
communication, prohibit speech of an insulting nature without 
significant qualifications. Standing in the majority, Justice McHugh 
held that insofar as the insulting words are used in the course of 
political discussion, “an unqualified prohibition on their use cannot 
be justified as compatible with the implied freedom.”188 His Honor 
also observed that “insults are a legitimate part of the political 
discussion protected by the Constitution.”189 Similarly, Justices 
Gummow and Hayne reminded that “insult and invective have been 
employed in political communication since the time of 
Demosthenes.”190 Justice Kirby concurred, arguing that Australia’s 
politics have regularly included “insult and emotion, calumny and 
invective,” and that the implied freedom must allow for this.191 
Therefore, the implied freedom has been found to protect insults, 
abuse, and ridicule made in the process of political communication. 
Such means of communication are recognized by the Court as a 
legitimate part of the political discussion in Australia.  
 Naturally, debates relating to the role of religion in political 
discussion might “be robust, exaggerated, angry, mixing fact and 
comment and commonly appealing to prejudice, fear and self-
interest.”192 The natural implication is that no law can prohibit 
religious speech that involves insults, abuse and/or ridicule, to the 
extent where such a speech is political in character.193 Of course, 
religious speech may also be political speech and when they are 
intertwined, “the decision in Coleman suggests that, absent 
qualifications of the kind relied upon by the majority, law which 
 
 186. Id. at 558–59. 
 187. Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
 188. Id. at 54. 
 189. Id. at 54. 
 190. Id. at 78. 
 191. Id. at 91. 
 192. Roberts v Bass [2002] CLR 1, 62–63 (Austl.). 
 193. Nicholas Aroney, The Constitutional (In)validity of Religious Vilification Laws: Implications 
for their Interpretation, 34 FED. L. REV. 288, 313 (2006). 
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prohibits religious vilification will infringe the implied freedom of 
political communication.”194 
The discussion about the limits of state control over religious 
speech was directly raised in Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of 
Adelaide, a case in which a 5-1 majority of the court upheld the 
validity of a local bylaw that prohibited the preaching in public space 
without a license from the city. In his majority ruling, Chief Justice 
French reminded that “Freedom of speech is a long-established 
common law freedom. It has been linked to the proper functioning of 
representative democracies and on that basis has informed the 
application of public interest considerations to claimed restraints 
upon publication of information.”195 However, he thought that the 
by-law in question was constitutionally valid because “the only 
purpose of the impugned provisions is to prevent obstruction of 
roads.”196 Justices Crennan and Kiefel concurred. So it was left only 
to Justice Heydon to dissent as he contended that those bylaws were 
invalid on the basis of the common law principle that vague and 
ambiguous provisions authorizing the making of such regulations 
are not sufficient to authorize a dramatic impairment of the freedom 
of speech.197 Overall, the decision is quite significant when 
considering the constitutional validity of religious vilification laws. 
As Noel Foster points out,  
the decision in the Adelaide Preachers case . . . affirms, in very 
strong terms, the value of freedom of speech as both a common law 
principle, and also a constitutional constraint on law-making. It 
seems fairly clear, as accepted in this case, that “religiously 
inspired” comments may be protected as sufficiently connected 
with “politics,” although no doubt there may be room to argue the 
matter in some future fact scenario.198  
 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Attorney-General (SA) v. Corp. of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3, 43 (Austl.). 
 196. Id. at 140. In sum, those regulations were held valid as a “reasonable” restraint on 
political speech for the purposes of traffic control. 
 197. Corp. of Adelaide [2013] HCA at 146. 
 198. Noel Foster, Anti-Vilification Laws and Freedom of Religion in Australia—Is 
Defamation Enough?, Paper presented at the conference Justice, Mercy and Conviction: 
Perspectives on Law, Religion and Ethics, University of Adelaide School of Law (June 7–9, 
2013). 
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On the other hand, in an article on the subject Professor 
Nicholas Aroney contends that, if properly construed, religious 
vilification laws could apply in “only very limited circumstances and 
for this reason are likely to be upheld as consistent with the implied 
freedom of political communication.”199 Aroney points to the 
interpretation by Judge Morris, the President of the Victorian Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal, who ruled that the RRTA “does not 
stop a person from engaging in conduct that involves contempt for, 
or severe ridicule of, a religious belief or activity, provide this does 
not incite hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe 
ridicule of another person or a class of persons on the grounds of 
such belief or activity.”200 Hence, Aroney concludes: 
To the extent that religious vilification laws are interpreted with 
principles such as these in mind, they are likely to leave sufficient 
room for freedom of religious discussion that happens to be 
relevantly political. The implied freedom of political communication 
means that the prohibitions imposed by religious vilification laws 
need to be interpreted narrowly, and the exceptions construed 
widely, in order to leave room for political communication. At the 
same time, however, to the extent that religious vilification laws are 
not (or cannot) interpreted in this way, there is good reason to 
think that they are unconstitutional.201 
Judge Morris must indeed be congratulated on his ability to 
recognize that at issue is the right of citizens living in a democratic 
society to cite statements of truth without the risk of being 
persecuted and sued by others, and no matter how undesirable these 
facts might be to a given person or minority group.202 One cannot 
help but wonder whether those who drafted the Victorian vilification 
legislation were of the same mind as him, or whether other judges, 
given the pervasive social pressures of political correctness and 
multiculturalism, would actually have courage to do the same. 
In Deen v Lamb, Mr. Lamb, an individual who was standing for 
local Parliament, was found to be protected by the implied right to 
 
 199. Aroney, supra note 193, at 317. 
 200. Fletcher v Salvation Army [2005] VCAT 1523 (Unreported, Morris P, Aug. 1, 2005) ¶ 7 
(Austl.). 
 201. Aroney, supra note 193, at 318. 
 202. Fletcher [2005] VCAT at ¶ 7. 
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political communication when he printed a brochure comparing the 
Bible with the Qur’an.203 In Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire 
Ministries, Inc., however, two pastors were initially found guilty of 
vilification for also comparing the Bible with the Koran, for quoting 
from the Koran, and for expressing concerns regarding the 
Islamization of Australia’s society, as well as the danger of Islamic 
ideology “infiltrating” the Parliament and other institutions of 
power.204 Of course, those pastors clearly touched on matters of 
political relevance, such as the ideology of one’s elected officials, 
immigration policies, prayer in schools, and the religious 
underpinnings of our country’s legal system.205 Although the 
Victorian Court of Appeal rejected the first-level decision, which 
condemned those two pastors, still the court argued that section 8 of 
the RRTA was constitutionally valid and hence not violating the 
implied right to political communication.206  
The High Court has never been faced with the opportunity to 
address the constitutional validity of religious vilification laws. 
Moreover, the question has curiously received very little scholarly 
attention. Of course, the scope of the implied right to political 
communication has been found to protect speech that is not in its 
nature political, so long as the “context, emphasis or content” is 
sufficiently political and limitations upon it would burden the 
implied freedom itself.207 Accordingly, the matter is basically 
whether the implied freedom of political communication can also 
give rise to an implied freedom of communication on religious 
grounds. I believe it clearly does. According to the Rev. Dr. Robert 
Forsyth, “religion is rarely simply a matter of private and personal 
issues alone. It involves communities and institutions and thus the 
need to give shape to the distinctive identity of those communities 
and institutions.”208 Indeed, as Professor Adrienne Stone observes, 
 
 203. Dean v Lamb [2001] QADT 20 (Austl.). 
 204. Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. [2004] VCAT 2510, 325, 326, 
341(Austl.). 
 205. Id. at 375. 
 206. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. v Islamic Council of Victoria [2006] VSCA 284 [210] 
(Austl.). 
 207. Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 CLR 104, 124 (Austl.). 
 208. Forsyth, supra note 63, at 4. 
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religious speech is in its nature intertwined with “political opinions, 
perspectives, philosophies and practices.”209 
But if religious and political matters are often intertwined, then 
one may easily conclude that any logical derivation to the limitation 
imposed on freedom of religious speech amounts to a violation of 
the implied freedom of political communication found in the 
Constitution, which means that the validity of religious vilification 
laws can reasonably be contested on the grounds of restricting the 
right of political communication that has been framed from a 
religious perspective. Of course, free speech is important because an 
informed public engaged in “critical reasoning” is necessary for 
representative democracy to flourish. Such critical reasoning takes 
place through political discourse in the public sphere, which in turn 
affects the way the citizens choose their political representatives. 
This political process is necessarily wide, reflecting the freedom to 
receive all information that may affect a citizen’s choices in the 
process of decision making. It seems reasonable then to consider 
that political communication may be easily embedded in a strong 
religious perspective. In such a context, political speech that is 
informed by a religious worldview should not be limited or restricted 
by the law, because the right to freedom of political communication 
should not be applied only to political statements based on non-
religious ideas, but also to political statements based on religious 
ideas, even if such statements are deeply annoying or offensive to 
some, as so many political statements based on non-religious ideas 
are. As Aroney points out, 
political discussion often involves disagreement about, and the 
defense or alternatively the criticism of, fundamental political 
perspectives, philosophies, and practices; and religion, religious 
beliefs and religious practices (as well as irreligious beliefs) not 
infrequently inform, or are tied up with, political perspectives, 
philosophies and practices. . . . And if political speech can at 
times involve what we might call political abuse (serious contempt, 
revulsion, severe ridicule and even hatred on political grounds), and 
if the line between religion and politics is itself a matter of political 
debate, it is doubtful . . . that speech that vilifies on the basis of 
 
 209. Adrianne Stone, Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of 
Political Communication, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 374, 386–87 (2001). 
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religion cannot, by definition, at the same time constitute speech 
that vilifies in a way that is politically relevant. And, if so, it follows 
that a law that prohibits religious vilification can, in at least some 
of its applications, constitute a relevant burden on freedom of 
political communication.210 
 
Although it is quite doubtful the High Court will ever consider 
religious vilifications laws to be constitutionally invalid, the fact is 
that these laws obviously target communications that are very 
closely associated or mixed up with communications concerning 
government and political matters.211 I am convinced that these laws 
interfere with the type of political discourse that is sometimes based 
on particular religious perspectives or worldviews, thereby unduly 
imposing on citizens an unreasonable hindrance to political speech 
that is motivated by religion and/or a religious perspective. As Dr. 
Darryn Jensen points out, “civilized communities institute practices 
to minimize—and ideally to eliminate—any disadvantage that 
individuals suffer by reason of their race or other attributes that they 
cannot change.”212 Nonetheless, as he also explains, the objects of 
the Victorian Act are of a different kind. They appeal not to inherent 
conditions that are biologically immutable, but rather to religious-
political ideals, which in turn become a criterion of reasonableness 
as an examination of what is politically acceptable. “Since the 
political ideals themselves are subject to different interpretations,” 
Jensen concludes, “the battle lines of interpretation [of religious 
vilification laws] are ultimately political battle lines.”213 
XI. CONCLUSION 
One of the alleged objectives of religious vilification laws is to 
promote a more “harmonious” and “tolerant” society. But rather 
than promoting real tolerance among the different religious groups, 
vilification laws have emphasized separateness and promoted 
victimhood among these groups. They have incited inter-religious 
 
 210. Aroney, supra note 193, at 306. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Darryn Jensen, The Battlelines of Interpretation in Racial Vilification Laws, 27(2) POLICY 
14, 18 (2011). 
 213. Id. 
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strife and community tension by criminalizing truth-telling and 
restricting freedom of speech, which is a cardinal precept of every 
open and democratic society. Ultimately, vilification laws make the 
government and its secular courts “complicit in a process of legal 
silencing undertaken by rival minority groups, engaging with them 
in debates of truth and falsehood, good and evil. The court decides  
essentially theological questions in the process of finding incitement 
to hatred against persons.”214 
In general terms, laws that make it a crime to voice comments 
deemed “offensive” to a religious group create undue fear and 
intimidation on people who wish to freely express their ideas and 
opinions. Such laws constitute a frontal attack on freedom of speech 
and expression; and this is why so many people in Australia seem 
quite reluctant to join public moral conversation, seeming to fear 
what others and even their own government might do in return. This 
is the tragedy of a so-called “multicultural” society which has 
embraced moral relativism and allowed the state to enact legislation 
that effectively prevents its citizens from speaking more freely and 
openly about fundamental issues of public morality. 
As explained in this article, there is no apparent reason as to why 
speech about religious matters should not simultaneously be 
characterized as political communication for the purposes of the 
right to freedom of political communication implied in the 
Australian Constitution. Accordingly, religious vilification laws such 
as the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act unreasonably 
compromise the constitutional right to freedom of political 
communication, which is a basic right of the citizen as derived from 
our system of government and implied in the Australian 
Constitution. 
 
 214. Harrison, supra note 15, at 72. 
